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Abstract
Antitrust exemptions granted to businesses under extenuating circumstances are often jus-
tied by the argument that they benet the public by helping producers adjust to otherwise
dicult economic circumstances. Such exemptions may allow rms to coordinate their capac-
ities, as was the case of post-September 11, 2001 antitrust immunity granted to Aloha and
Hawaiian Airlines. We conduct economic laboratory experiments to determine the eects of
explicit capacity coordination on oligopoly rms' abilities to adjust to negative demand shocks
and on industry prices. The results suggest that capacity coordination speeds the adjustment
process, but also has a clear pro-collusive eect on rm behavior.
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11 Introduction
It is not unusual for rms in distressed industries to seek government assistance. In industries
experiencing a sharp and sudden decrease in demand, rms may request help in coordinating a
capacity reduction. In the years following World War II, many of Japan's large industrial rms
faced the task of reducing their wartime capacity and encountered the dicult strategic situation
of making unilateral reductions. This prompted the creation of an industrial policy to facilitate the
structured and balanced reduction of capacity across all rms in the industry (Peck et al. 1987).
In Europe, competition law may allow rms in a distressed industry to form \crisis cartels," or
agreements to systematically restrict output or reduce capacity in response to a crisis in the indus-
try. Indeed, crisis cartels were formed in the European synthetic ber industry in the 1980's and in
the Dutch brick industry in the 1990's. In each case, the agreements provided for specic capacity
reductions by individual producers in response to structural excess capacities in the corresponding
industries (Fiebig, 1999; Simpson, 2004). A similar attempt to balance capacity reduction in the
face of decreased demand took place recently in the United States. In 2002, the U.S. Department
of Transportation granted antitrust immunity to Aloha and Hawaiian Airlines in order to facilitate
a bilateral reduction in inter-island 
ight capacity in Hawaii after a reduction in demand following
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Beyond merely permitting the two companies to coordi-
nate their capacity reduction, the immunity agreement created a mechanism for revenue transfers
designed to punish either company if they deviated from the agreed-upon capacity reduction.1
In this study, we use economic experiments to examine the eects of capacity coordination
on industry performance in response to a negative demand shock. One could argue that explicit
coordination by rms is critical in the face of a challenging reduction in demand. But such coordi-
nation may also encourage anti-competitive behavior by the participating rms. Proponents of the
Aloha-Hawaiian antitrust immunity agreement argued that it was impossible for the two airlines to
unilaterally reduce their capacity enough to avoid bankruptcy in reaction to a post-9/11 reduction
in air travel (Aloha Airlines and Hawaiian Airlines, 2002).2 The U.S. Department of Justice, in
opposing the anti-trust exemption, claimed that the agreement would undermine consumer welfare
by allowing the airlines market power sucient to reduce service and raise prices well above the
competitive level. Inter-island airfares did rise dramatically following the inception of the agree-
1An earlier case of coordinated capacity reduction in the U.S. airline industry took place in 1971, when the Civil
Aeronautics Board approved a capacity limitations agreement among three airline carriers (Eads, 1974). In other
historical circumstances producers were granted government permission to coordinate a variety strategic economic
variables, as was the case under the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (e.g., Alexander, 1994). Recently,
newspaper companies in the U.S. have discussed the need for an anti-trust exemption that would allow them to
jointly set prices for their Web content (Los Angeles Times, February 4, 2009.)
2Aloha Airlines declared bankruptcy and went out of business in Spring 2008 despite the immunity agreement.
Arguably, however, the primary reason for Aloha's going out of business was entry by a competitor airline go!, not
the 2001 demand shock.
2ment in 2002 (Blair et al., 2007; Kamita, 2010).3 Yet, it is dicult to conclude, based on mere eld
data analysis, whether these price increases were necessarily due to the capacity coordination. Fur-
ther, it is dicult to determine whether or not explicit coordination was necessary for the rms to
reduce their capacity in the face of decreased demand. Experimental methods have the advantage
of permitting researchers to isolate eects of specic institutional features (Plott, 1989). Economic
experiments have proven increasingly useful both in detecting anti-competitive eects of various
industry practices (Grether and Plott, 1984; Oerman and Potters, 2006; Deck and Wilson, 2008),
and in evaluating techniques used by antitrust authorities to hinder collusion (Apesteguia et al.,
2007; Hinloopen and Soetevent, 2008).
There are theoretical and empirical arguments in the literature both for and against antitrust
authorities allowing explicit capacity coordination. Capacity coordination in response to an un-
expected negative demand shock in the airline industry may be justied by its cost structure,
which includes large sunk costs (e.g., the cost of acquiring an aircraft) and large costs that can
be avoided by not 
ying the aircraft but become xed once the 
ight is scheduled (e.g., the cost
for fuel and crew). As the scheduling of 
ights takes place before the seats are booked, the air-
lines run the risk of not covering their total costs unless they can predict the demand accurately
and are able to set prices at levels above their marginal costs. This accounts for the necessity of
above-marginal-cost pricing by rms in industries with large sunk and avoidable costs (Sjostrom,
1989; Durham et al, 2004; see also Van Boening and Wilcox, 1996). Kreps and Sheinkman (1983)
develop a two-stage oligopoly model where rms rst set their capacities, and then engage in price
competition. They demonstrate that in this setting, Cournot-level above-marginal-cost pricing will
emerge even without explicit capacity coordination, provided that the rms observe each other's
capacity choices prior to setting their prices. This model appears appropriate for the airline indus-
try, where capacities (
ight schedules) are set before tickets are sold and companies may observe
each other's capacities though publicly announced 
ight schedules. However, rms' knowledge of
demand is an essential assumption in the Kreps and Scheinkman model. An unanticipated demand
shock may lead to over-investment in capacity and losses either from unsold seats, or from marginal
cost pricing.4 Further, it may be unrealistic to expect rms to adjust to new demand conditions
instantaneously. If explicit capacity coordination allows rms to adjust to these new conditions
faster, then it may help the rms avoid losses and stay in business. This could yield an argument
for the antitrust exemption, provided that welfare gains from doing so outweigh potential costs to
consumers.
3Kamita (2010) reports not only that prices rose during the period of coordination, but that they remained high
until the entry of a new competitor, two and a half years after the antitrust immunity expired.
4If the demand shock is unanticipated, then capacities set before the shock become exogenous. Depending on the
level of capacity set, the subsequent Bertrand price competition may result in either marginal cost pricing, or in price
instability due non-existence of pure strategy equilibrium in prices (Osborne and Pitchik, 1986; see also Kruse et al.,
1994).
3The argument against explicit capacity coordination is backed by a large theoretical, empirical
and experimental literature on collusion in oligopoly. Both game-theoretical (Tirole, 1988) and
experimental research (Fouraker and Siegel, 1963; Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Huck et al.,
2004) indicates that industries with a small number of rms with symmetric cost structures, who
interact repeatedly under known and stable demand conditions,5 are prone to tacit collusion in
the form of above-competitive pricing. Empirical evidence of collusion in oligopolies, especially
duopolies, is also quite rich (Rees, 1993; Levenstein and Suslow, 2006). Though it is plausible
that duopolists in an industry with stable demand could achieve above-competitive pricing, an
unexpected negative demand shock would constitute a major challenge (Levenstein and Suslow,
2006; Staiger and Wolak, 1992).6 An antitrust immunity agreement that allows rms to explicitly
coordinate and enforce capacity reductions could help rms establish or re-establish collusive pricing
in a new environment and in this way have a detrimental eect on consumer welfare.
There are several cases detailed in the literature in which government authorities have uninten-
tionally helped rms to collude (Albaek et al., 1997); and other cases in which explicit coordination
helped rms to avoid bankruptcy (Sjostrom, 1989). In this view, consideration of the eect of ca-
pacity coordination on competition and overall outcomes in an industry experiencing an unexpected
demand shocks is of particular interest.
In this article we report on an economic laboratory experiment that was conducted to evaluate
eects of capacity coordination on oligopolistic industry performance. We recreate the Kreps and
Sheinkman (1983) two-stage capacity and price setting duopoly game in the economic laboratory,
but with repeated play in order to model rms who interact with each other for a long time under
known and stable demand conditions. This allows us to establish, as a baseline, whether rms
are likely to engage in above-marginal-cost pricing even without explicit coordination. We then
institute a negative demand shock halfway through each experimental session, in order to investigate
its eect on rm behavior. By then varying regulatory regimes after the demand shock (allowing
or not allowing capacity coordination, and enforcing or not enforcing the agreed-upon capacity
restrictions), we further consider how dierent capacity coordination regimes aect post-shock
industry outcomes. This method allows us to evaluate whether capacity coordination agreements
5Blair et al. (2007) report that at the time of September 11th attacks, Hawaii's inter-island airline industry was
largely dominated by two main providers, Aloha and Hawaiian airlines. These two providers had symmetric cost
structures, close to equal market shares, provided homogeneous product and had been operating in this industry for
a long time, with only occasional and largely unsuccessful entry. See also Kamita (2010).
6Reviewing the empirical literature on collusion, Levenstein and Suslow (2006) write: \Cartels break down oc-
casionally because of cheating and lack of eective monitoring, but the biggest challenge cartels face are entry and
adjustment of collusive agreement in response to changing economic conditions. Cartels that develop organizational
structures that allow them the 
exibility to respond to changing economic conditions are more likely to survive" (p.
43). Even though Levenstein and Suslow focus their analysis on the \hard-core" cartels, their arguments fully apply
to tacit collusion where collusive outcomes may be supported by a repeated game-theoretic argument. Theoretical
models, such as Staiger and Wolak (1992), also predict that periods of low demand would lead, through the emergence
of excess capacity, to a breakdown of collusive pricing.
4are likely to facilitate capacity reduction and to what extent these agreements are anti-competitive.
Davis (1999) and Muren (2000) study experimental triopoly markets in repeated settings in the
framework of the Kreps and Sheinkman (1983) two-stage capacity and price setting game. Davis
nds that capacity pre-setting raises prices and reduces capacity, though with substantial varia-
tion across markets. Muren reports that capacity choices for inexperienced subjects are higher
(more competitive) than the Kreps and Sheinkman (1983) model predicts. Goodwin and Mestel-
man (2010) also report that inexperienced subjects over-invest in capacities in the Kreps and
Sheinkman duopolies, but that capacities converge to the Cournot prediction as subject gain ex-
perience. However, these papers do not consider demand changes, which is the main focus of our
study. Other experimental studies analyze the ability of market institutions to adjust to supply
and demand shifts (e.g., Williams and Smith, 1984; Davis et al., 1993). Still others consider the
eects of certain industrial practices or government programs on market outcomes (e.g., Grether
and Plott, 1984; Hinloopen and Soetevent, 2008), but under stable economic conditions. Many
experiments investigate collusion in a variety of market settings, but only a few (e.g., Brown et.
al., 2009) explore the robustness of established collusive practices under changing conditions. The
unique contribution of this article is two-fold. First, we study the eect of a negative demand
shock on rms' abilities to sustain above-marginal-cost pricing in the Kreps and Sheinkman (1983)
two-stage capacity and price competition framework. This setting is arguably more complex than
simple quantity- or price- oligopoly competition; therefore it may be more challenging for rms to
adjust to changes in demand. Second, we focus on the eects of regulatory measures that may
be instituted in response to sudden negative changes in economic conditions. Our experimental
evidence adds to and complements the scarce empirical literature (e.g., Kamita 2010) on the eect
of capacity coordination on rms' abilities to both adjust capacities and engage in tacit collusion.
Our key experimental ndings are as follows. First, we observed that explicit capacity coordina-
tion helped rms quickly adjust their capacities when demand conditions changed. Yet, most rms
reduced capacities immediately after the demand shock even in the markets where no explicit coor-
dination was allowed. The demand shock did not result in persistent losses and rm bankruptcies
in any of the markets.7 Further, we obtained strong evidence that in many experimental markets,
capacity coordination had a pronounced pro-collusive eect on rm behavior. Whereas prices fell
and remained low after the demand shock in markets without capacity coordination, prices quickly
recovered and even increased in markets with coordination. This is quite remarkable because, in
our experiment, sellers coordinated capacities in settings more restrictive than real-world capac-
ity negotiations. Negotiations in our experiment were computer-mediated, and were restricted to
alternating capacity proposals, with the additional ability, in some treatments, to engage in mod-
7In fact, the only market where the sellers experienced on-going losses and went bankrupt was in the treat-
ment allowing for coordination (NegPun); see table 1. These losses were most likely attributable to seller lack of
understanding of the market, rather than the demand shock, as the losses persisted from early before-shock periods.
5erated online chats.8 Finally, we observed that whereas the ability to coordinate capacity levels
had a signicant eect on reducing capacities and increasing prices immediately after the negoti-
ations started, agreement enforcement and supplementary free-style communication became more
important in sustaining the agreements in later periods.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Research objectives, design and procedures are
given in Section 2. Section 3 presents the results, and Section 4 concludes.
2 Research objectives and experimental design
The experiment is designed to explore the eects of capacity coordination in an oligopoly industry
experiencing a sudden negative demand shock. Specic research objectives are the following. First,
we explore rms' abilities to avoid excess capacities and achieve and sustain above-marginal-cost
pricing without explicit coordination in a repeated two-stage capacity-price-setting duopoly.9 Sec-
ond, we study the eects of a negative demand shock on industry outcomes in this environment,
and on producers' abilities to adjust to the new demand conditions without explicit coordination.
Third, we examine the ability of several capacity coordination institutions to help producers adjust
to a negative demand shock. We compare the speed and the extent of capacity reduction under
each institution, and the eects of the institutions on rm prots as a proxy for producer welfare.
Finally, we investigate whether capacity coordination has a pro-collusive eect on rm behavior,
leading to higher industry prices.
Experimental Design The basic design mirrors the Kreps and Sheinkman (1983; hereafter KS
1983) two-stage capacity-price duopoly model, except, similar to many market experiments, we
add a repeated setting as this is more appropriate in modeling many real-world oligopolies. Each
market is conducted as a series of trading periods in which two subjects in the roles of sellers
compete to sell units of a ctitious good to a simulated buyer with a known linear demand. In line
with KS (1983), the institution is a modied posted oer market, where subjects specify production
and observe the production level of their counterpart prior to setting a price in each period. The
capacity setting is simultaneous and - in the rst part of each experimental session - is undertaken
without communication between the sellers. Sellers incur costs on each unit of capacity produced
regardless of how many units they actually sell. The capacities set by each seller are then revealed
to the other seller in the market, after which the sellers simultaneously and privately specify an
8In reality, capacity coordination between rms may take place under more pro-collusive conditions. The 2002
Aloha-Hawaiian anti-trust exemption allowed representatives of both airlines to meet every 30 days to agree on 
ight
capacities for the next month. The meetings took place behind closed doors, with apparently no direct oversight from
the Attorney General's oce. Experimental research shows that face-to-face communication has a strong positive
eect on cooperation (e.g., Crawford, 1998).
9In this part, the study complements Davis (1999) by considering a setting where capacity is a continuous choice
variable. Davis studies experimental triopolies where each seller had a maximum of six units of capacity.
6asking price for the goods they have produced. After that, the simulated buyer purchases units
from the sellers, buying from the lower price seller rst.10 At the end of each trading period, sales
and the corresponding prots or losses are reported to the sellers along with the posted price and
sales of the other seller.
Parameters Each seller faces a constant marginal cost of 10 experimental dollars per unit and no
xed costs. We abstract from a more realistic setting of large xed costs and non-constant marginal
cost to focus on the issue of capacity coordination and its eect on the prices in a relatively simple
environment. Each seller makes their capacity and pricing decisions in light of a known continuous
linear demand function, which was set to be Q = 304   4(p) for the rst 21 trading periods.
In the 22nd period, a demand shock is induced by a decrease in the intercept of the demand
function. The post-shock demand that persists for the remainder of the session is then Q =
256   4(p).
This decrease in demand occurs in the course of a period (referred to as the \shock period")
after the capacity setting stage has elapsed. Subjects are made aware of the change at that time
and post their price in light of the new demand information. Subjects are warned during the
instructions that a change in the demand is possible.
These supply and demand conditions imply a market price and quantity combination associated
with each of three plausible theoretical benchmarks: Competitive Equilibrium (CE, which would
imply marginal cost pricing and outcomes identical to Bertrand competition); Cournot outcome
(as predicted by KS, 1983), and Monopoly outcome (which may be supported by repeated play and
possibly enhanced by explicit capacity coordination). These theoretical benchmarks are displayed
in the top three rows of Tables 2 and 3. The demand parameters are chosen so that the pre-shock
Cournot price ($32 experimental) is below the post-shock monopoly price ($37 experimental),
allowing for the replication of the post-shock price increase observed after the inception of the
anti-trust exemption agreement between Aloha and Hawaiian airlines.
Treatments The before-shock trading periods are conducted identically under all treatments,
with no capacity coordination. The demand shock is then instituted in period 22, followed by
three transition periods (periods 22-24, which we call the \shock periods") with no coordination.
This short span of shock periods allows us to assess whether the subjects attempt to unilaterally
adjust to the new demand conditions immediately after the shock, before any coordination takes
place. Starting from period 25, we vary capacity coordination and enforcement institutions across
sessions, giving rise to four distinct treatments:
10Given the capacities and prices, the sales are determined exactly as specied in the KS (1983) model. See
Experimental Instructions, included in Appendix A.
7Treatment \No Negotiations, No Punishment" (NoNegNoPun). In this baseline treat-
ment, the demand shock is followed by 14-16 additional periods under the new demand conditions
with no explicit capacity coordination. The institution is the same as in the pre-shock periods.
Treatment \Negotiations, Punishment" (NegPun) is modeled after the 2002 Hawaiian
- Aloha airlines anti-trust exemption. Following the three shock periods, the capacity coordination
mechanism is imposed and persists for the remainder of the session. In an additional stage at the
beginning of each period, sellers negotiate and agree upon a capacity prior to setting it. In the
event that either seller chooses to produce more than the agreed amount that period, the oender
is penalized seven experimental dollars per unit produced over the agreed capacity, an amount
chosen to exceed any potential gains that might accrue to the seller who broke the agreement.
This penalty is transferred to the other seller. In the event that both exceed the agreed upon
amount, the penalty is accrued to each with the net balance determined by the relative size of the
divergence of each seller. This setting is designed to mimic the actual revenue transfer clause of
the Aloha-Hawaiian airlines agreement.11
The negotiation stage takes the form of a real-time bargaining session. Each seller can propose
a per seller capacity. During this negotiation stage, a seller can change their proposal at any time
as many times as they wish. Each seller, seeing the current proposal of the other seller, can choose
to propose a dierent capacity, accept the proposal of the other seller, or do nothing at all. Upon
either seller accepting the proposal of another, the negotiations end immediately and the sellers
proceed to the next, capacity-setting, stage. If no proposal is accepted in the time allotted for
negotiations (120 seconds), there is no agreement in place for that period.
Treatment \Negotiations, No Punishment" (NegNoPun) is identical to the NegPun
treatment described above, except that there is no penalty for breaking the capacity agreement.
This treatment is designed to isolate the eects of the enforcement (in the form of the revenue
transfer clause) on the eectiveness of the agreement.
Treatment \Negotiations, No Punishment, Chat" (NegChat) replicates the Neg-
NoPun treatment but allows, in parallel with structured negotiations, free form communication
between the subjects in a chat window. This treatment is motivated by a large body of existing
literature on non-binding communication in experimental markets and games (e.g., Holt, 1995;
Crawford, 1998). It aims to investigate whether free-style non-binding communication could lead
to better coordination than the structured negotiations alone, and whether it may substitute for an
explicit punishment clause in promoting and maintaining capacity reductions. Chats are monitored
11In setting the penalty level, we assumed that explicit capacity coordination may lead to the perfectly collusive
monopoly outcome. Using the best response analysis, we then calculated the highest gain from deviation that a rm
could obtain assuming the other rm sticks to the agreement. We then set the penalty per each unit of capacity
excess at about 60% of possible per unit gain from deviation. Blair et al (2007) report that the revenue transfer
clause of the actual Aloha-Hawaiian agreement set the penalty at the level corresponding to around 60-100% of extra
revenue that a deviating party could obtain from each unit exceeding the agreed capacity level.
8and subjects are warned not to discuss price in their chats, with the threat of removal from the
experiment if they do not comply.
Procedures 41 two-person markets were conducted over the course of 13 experimental sessions,
with eight sessions conducted at the University of Hawaii at Manoa (UHM hereafter) and ve
sessions conducted at the University of Alaska Anchorage (UAA hereafter). Table 1 provides a
summary of the experimental sessions.
TABLE 1 AROUND HERE
Each session began with an oral reading of the instructions and the completion of a quiz con-
rming the subjects' understanding of the instructions; see Appendix A.12 The experiment was
computerized using the z-tree software (Fischbacher 2007). Subjects were seated at visually iso-
lated computer terminals with communication limited to the experiment interface. Each market
consisted of between 35 and 39 periods with the number of periods unknown to the subject before-
hand. All markets were conducted with the subjects' full and common information of the demand
and cost conditions. Demand conditions were presented to the subjects in tabular form and in
the form of an on-screen calculator. The calculator allowed the subjects to evaluate their own
and the other seller's earnings for each capacity and price combination before making the actual
capacity and price choices; see Appendix B for a screen shot of subject decision screen with built-in
calculator. Session length ranged between 2 and 3 hours.
Subjects were selected from the general undergraduate population at the two universities. No
subject participated in more than one experimental session. Subjects received $5 for showing up
on time and were provided an initial budget of $5 to oset any losses incurred early in the session.
Subjects were also given a small per period endowment of 50 experimental dollars in each trading
period. Conversion rate was 1750 experimental dollars per U.S. dollar. The overwhelming majority
of the subjects earned between US $11 and $47, including show-up fees, with the average of US
$31.46.13
12The rst three sessions conducted at UH did not have a quiz. The quiz was later included to facilitate subject
understanding of the instructions. The main instructions, which were identical for all sessions, contained many
hypothetical examples to ensure subject understanding. We test whether the quiz had an eect on subject behavior
in the experiment by comparing pre-shock average capacities, prices, earnings and sale volumes in sessions with and
without the quiz. The null hypothesis that the pre-shock market capacities, prices, earnings and sale volumes in
markets where the subjects did and did not take the quiz were drawn from equal distributions, cannot be rejected
at any conventional signicance level (Mann-Whitney test, two-sided). We conclude that the quiz, while possibly
facilitating subject understanding of the instructions, did not have a signicant eect on subject actual behavior.
13Sessions 1 and 2 had a higher exchange rate of 1000 experimental dollars per U.S. dollar, resulting in much higher
dollar earnings, with no signicant dierences in subject behavior from the remainder of the sessions. One outlier
subject in Session 10 earned $75 by ripping o nearly all monopoly prots in the market, while their competitor
earned only $14. In another market in Session 10, both subjects went bankrupt; the latter market is excluded from
the analysis.
93 Results
The analysis is organized in two subsections. First, we look at the aggregate results, focusing
on treatment eects. Next, we study convergence properties of each market, allowing for market
heterogeneity within and across treatments.
Aggregate results and cross-treatment comparisons
The data from the experimental sessions are presented in Tables 2-4 and Figures 1-2. The data
analysis revealed no signicant dierences in market performances between the UHM and UAA
subject pools; hence we present the statistics by treatment pooled across both locations. Tables 2-
4 show descriptive statistics by treatment, with independent markets as the units of observation.
The tables report the total capacities (Table 2) produced in each market, in physical units; the
average selling price of the goods weighted by the number of sales at each price (Table 3), and the
average subject earnings per period (Table 4), in experimental dollars. We report the descriptive
statistics for the span of periods prior to the demand shock (\before shock" periods); for the short
span between the demand shock and the period when the coordination mechanism is imposed in
the corresponding treatments (\shock" periods 22-24); and the periods following the imposition
of the treatments (\after shock" periods). Before and after shock data are organized into seven-
period intervals: early periods before the demand shock (periods 8-14);14 later periods before the
shock (periods 15-21); \early" after-shock periods, which are seven periods right after the capacity
coordination institutions in the corresponding treatments were imposed (periods 25-31); and \late"
after-shock periods, from period 32 till the end of the experiment (typically, periods 32-39).15 To
account for subject learning in early periods before the shock, we use the later periods before the
demand change (periods 15-21), rather than the earlier periods, as a benchmark for comparison
with the shock and after-shock periods. Further, we will compare market characteristics in the early
after-shock periods (periods 25-31) with those in the later after-shock periods (periods 32-end) to
evaluate if the speed of adjustment to the demand change varied across treatments.
Figures 1-2 display time-series data for capacities, prices and prot medians, as well as market
sales. Figure 1 compares No Negotiations markets with all Negotiations markets pooled, whereas
Figure 2 shows the medians for all four treatments separately. We also display the benchmark
theoretical predictions for Monopoly, Cournot, and Competitive Equilibrium market dynamics.
Note the shift in these curves that occurs in period 22 representing the demand shock imposed at
that time.
TABLES 2-4 AND FIGURES 1-2 AROUND HERE
14The statistics for the rst several periods of each session are not reported to control for potentially wide variations
in the time it took subjects to familiarize themselves with the experiment structure.
15Two sessions were cut short due to time constraint with the shortest ending in the period 35. See Table 1.
10Large standard deviations of the variables, reported in Tables 2-4, indicate substantial variations
in the data across markets in every treatment. In addition, prices and capacities varied within each
market across time periods. The large variations observed in the data are consistent with ndings
by Davis (1999), who posits that it is the specic nature of the two-step task in this environment
that makes it challenging for subjects. The Kreps and Sheinkman (1983) model requires each seller
to perform sophisticated backward induction in order to determine the predicted capacity setting.
However, the variations narrowed over the course of each session in all treatments16 suggesting
substantial learning eects in the course of the session. More importantly, despite the noise in the
data, the results below clearly demonstrate that experimental subject behavior was sensitive to
both changes in the demand conditions, and to variations in institutions.
We start by documenting the performance of experimental markets in the periods before the
shock. Note that our treatments are all identical up to period 24 (i.e., until institutional arrange-
ments to coordinate capacities are put in place in the corresponding treatments). Therefore, we
pool the data across treatments in the pre-shock and shock periods.
Result 1 Prior to the demand shock, subjects often set capacities well in excess of those predicted
by Kreps and Sheinkman (1983). Yet, in most markets subjects set capacities below the competitive
equilibrium benchmark.
Support: Figures 1-2 (\Capacity" panels), Table 2. Based on periods 15-21 averages, the market
capacities before the shock were at or above the Competitive Equilibrium predictions in 10 out of
41 markets, between the Cournot and the Competitive Equilibrium predictions in 25 out of 41
markets, and below the Cournot levels in the remaining 6 markets. The average (as well as the
median; see Figure 2) market capacities before the shock were between the Cournot and Competitive
theoretical benchmarks in all treatments, with the overall mean of 231.59 (seven-period average
before the shock) as compared to the Cournot capacity of 176 and the Competitive Equilibrium
capacity of 264. 2
Informal post-experiment debrieng suggested that some subjects were averse to exhausting
their entire capacity and allowing their counterpart to serve a portion of the demand at a higher
price. This high capacity levels had a ripple eect throughout the data. Because of high capacity
settings, pricing competition was substantial, driving average prices below the Cournot prediction.
Result 2 Even in the absence of explicit coordination, prices exceeded those predicted by strict
Bertrand price competition, but were below Cournot level before the shock. Consistent with Kreps
and Sheinkman (1983) prediction, markets with lower capacities were characterized by higher prices.
16The average standard deviation of market capacity within a market was 59.71 in the periods before the shock,
but it decreased to 35.42 in the periods after the shock. This decrease in variations in capacities over the course of
the sessions occurred in each treatment.
11Support: Figures 1-2, Table 3. Based on periods 15-21 averages, the mean price before the shock
was 25.54 experimental dollars, as compared to the Cournot prediction of 32 and the Competitive
Equilibrium prediction of 10 experimental dollars. Comparing prices and capacities across mar-
kets, the market trading price was negatively related to market capacity: in markets with average
capacity exceeding the competitive equilibrium, the average trading price was 17.48 experimental
dollars, as compared to the average price of 25.39 in the markets with capacities averaging between
the Competitive and Cournot predictions, and compared to the average price of 39.66 in the mar-
kets with capacities at or below the Cournot level. We further analyzed whether, having set the
capacities, the subjects made pricing decisions in accordance with the KS predictions. Whereas
the prices in the pricing subgames fell within the exact theoretical bounds only in 40% of the cases
before the shock, they were within 5 experimental dollars from the theoretical predictions in 81%
of the cases. The average price deviation from the theoretically predicted price (or the range of
prices, if the equilibrium prediction in the pricing subgame involved mixed strategies) was only 0.96
experimental dollars. 2
We conclude that advanced capacity setting allowed our experimental subjects to achieve and
sustain below competitive equilibrium production levels and above marginal cost prices even with-
out explicit coordination. This conrms the ndings by Davis (1999) on super-competitive pricing,
in a quite dierent market setting. Yet, the observed market outcomes were, on average, charac-
terized by higher capacities and lower prices than the KS (1983) model predicts. Given capacities,
the sellers in our experiment charged prices that were, on average, slightly above the theoretically
predicted, as documented in the support to Result 2. As a consequence, some capacities were not
utilized. Comparing market capacities with sales (see Figures 1-2), the markets before the shock
were characterized by an average excess capacity of 52.11 units, which was reduced to 38.34 units
in the seven periods immediately preceding the shock.
We now turn to the eects of the unexpected demand change on market performance. In this
section, we rely on non-parametric tests to evaluate the dierences across time intervals (Wilcoxon
signed ranks test) and across treatments (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum test; WMW here-
after), with individual market averages used as the units of observation. The reported p-values
are for one-sided tests when the underlying hypotheses are directional; that is, when comparing
market characteristics before and after the shock, and when comparing the negotiations and the
no negotiations markets. In all other cases, the reported p-values are for two-sided tests.
Result 3 Substantial capacity reductions occurred immediately following the demand shock.
Support: Figures 1-2, Table 2. Comparing market capacity levels between the pre-shock periods
(periods 15-21) and shock periods (periods 22-24), capacities fell signicantly immediately following
12the shock (p-value is 0.0008, Wilcoxon signed ranks test, one-sided). On average, capacity decreased
by 24.78 units in the shock periods as compared to seven periods before the shock. 2
Result 4 Prices and seller prots dropped immediately after the demand shock.
Support: Figures 1-2, Tables 3-4. Prices and seller prots fell immediately following the shock
(in periods 22-24), as compared to before the shock (periods 15-21); the corresponding p-values
are 0.0001 for trading prices and 0.0000 for seller prots. The average trading price decreased by
3.79 experimental dollars, which is not signicantly dierent from the decrease of 4 experimental
dollars that would occur under Cournot-level equilibrium pricing (p-value is 0.9638). Seller prots
decreased, on average, by 596.96 experimental dollars, which again is not signicantly dierent from
a decrease of 640 experimental dollars that would occur following the shift to the new equilibrium
in the KS model (p-value is 0.8005). 2
The above two results clearly demonstrate that the sellers in our experimental markets started
adjusting their behavior immediately in response to the change in market conditions. This presents
evidence that cost-cutting capacity reduction in industries in crisis can occur even if rms are
unable to coordinate the reductions explicitly.17 However, capacity coordination did allow for a
larger and faster decrease in excess capacities, as we demonstrate below.
We now compare the ability of dierent capacity coordination institutions to help producers
to adjust to new demand conditions, as well as to raise prices and prots. In analyzing treatment
eects, we focus on comparing the changes in key variables, rather than their absolute values, across
the multi-period intervals dened above as \before shock," \shock," and \after shock." This allows
us to directly compare the treatment eects while controlling for naturally occurring variation in
the baseline (before-shock and shock) values.18
Result 5 Capacity coordination resulted in a larger and faster reduction of excess market capacity
following the demand shock.
Support: Figures 1-2, Table 2. The capacity decreased, on average, from the shock periods
to the seven periods after the shock (periods 25-31) by 51.3 units in the markets with capacity
coordination, but it only decreased by 21.3 units in the markets without capacity coordination; the
dierence is statistically signicant (p-value is .0124, WMW test). Considering the data for each
coordination treatment separately, the reduction in capacities was signicantly larger in two out of
17The media also present ample evidence of unilateral capacity reductions in industries in crises; e.g., \Airlines Cut
Long Flights To Save Fuel Costs," Wall Street Journal, July 8, 2008; \Continental to cut 3,000 jobs, slash capacity,

ights," marketwatch.com, June 5, 2008; \Alcoa to Reduce Capacity By 18%, Cut 13,500 Workers," bloomberg.com,
January 9, 2009.
18We also conducted dierence-in-dierences estimations of treatment eects using panel regressions. The results,
reported in Table 9 in Appendix C, are overwhelmingly the same as those based on the non-parametric tests.
13the three capacity coordination treatments as compared to the baseline NoNegNoPun treatment
(NegNoPun: p-value is 0.0144; NegPun: p-value is 0.0173). As evident in Table 2, the average after-
shock capacities in coordination treatments NegNoPun and NegPun were below that in the baseline
NoPunNoNeg treatment, and near the Cournot prediction in the rst seven periods following the
demand shock (periods 25-31). While capacity reduction continued in the NoNegNoPun treatment
in the late after-shock periods (periods 32-end), the overall capacity decrease from the shock periods
to the late after-shock periods remained larger is the markets with coordination (56.81 units) than
in the markets without coordination (35.6 units). 2
Result 6 In the absence of explicit capacity coordination, prices did not signicantly change in
the periods after the demand shock. In contrast, with capacity coordination, prices increased in
the after-shock periods, reaching or exceeding the Cournot level. The dierences in price dynamics
between the no coordination and coordination treatments are signicant.
Support: Figures 1-2, Table 3. Comparing the prices in the shock and after-shock periods, in
the baseline NoNegNoPun treatment the prices decreased in the rst seven periods after the shock
by the average of 1.25 experimental dollars, and then increased by 1.76 experimental dollars in the
following periods; neither the initial decrease nor the subsequent increase are statistically signicant
(the corresponding p-values are 0:9218 and 0:4316, sign rank test.) In contrast, the prices increased
from the shock to the after-shock periods in all negotiation treatments by the overall average of
7.48 experimental dollars by the early periods after the shock, and by the overall average of 8.30
experimental dollars by the late periods; the increase is statistically signicant (p-value is 0.0000
for comparison between both time intervals). The dierence in price changes between the no
negotiations and the negotiations treatments is highly signicant for the early after-shock periods
(p = 0:0016, WMW test), and is still signicant for the late after-shock periods (p = 0:0733).
It is also instructive to compare price changes between pre-shock and after-shock periods. Given
either Cournot or Monopoly benchmark predictions, a negative demand shock would be expected
to reduce prices in after-shock periods. Indeed, the average price decreased from the seven periods
before the shock to the seven periods after the shock in the baseline NoNegNoPun treatment (p-
value is 0.0137, sign rank test). In contrast, the average price in the negotiations markets increased
from before to after the shock (p-value is 0.0456). The average price was below the Cournot
prediction in the seven periods after the shock in the NoNegNoPun treatment (p-value is 0.0367),
but it was not statistically dierent from the Cournot prediction in the negotiation treatments
(p=0.3779). Even though the average price in the no negotiations treatment reached the pre-
shock level in the late periods after the shock, it was still below the average prices in each of the
negotiations treatments. 2
14From Figures 1-2, one can clearly recognize that in the capacity coordination treatments, prices
return to and further exceed pre-shock levels despite a reduction in demand. This mirrors the
post-exemption price increases for inter-island travel in Hawaii documented in Blair et al. (2007)
and Kamita (2010). This nding suggests the potential for consumer-welfare reducing collusion
beyond that which would occur in the absence of explicit coordination across sellers.
Result 7 Without negotiations, prots stayed at the low shock-period levels for many periods after
the demand shock and did not start recovering until later in the sessions. In contrast, with explicit
capacity coordination, the after-shock prots quickly recovered to the pre-shock levels.
Support: Figures 1-2, Table 4. Looking at the baseline NoNegNoPun treatment, the seller
prots did not change signicantly from the shock periods in the rst seven periods after the shock
(p-value is 0.6250). Consequently, the after-shock prots stayed signicantly below the before-
shock prots in the rst seven periods following the demand shock (p=0.0136). Even though
the prots started to increase in the late after-shock periods, they stayed, on average, below the
pre-shock levels. The picture is quite dierent for two out of three negotiations treatments. The
prots increased signicantly from the shock periods to the seven periods after the shock in both
NegNoPun and NegPun treatments; p-values are: 0.0274 for NegNoPun and 0.0010 for NegPun.
Further, prots reached the pre-shock levels in the seven periods after the shock: p-values for
the dierences between the pre-shock prots and the after-shock prots are 0.8992 for NegNoPun
and 0.3652 for NegPun. In the third negotiations treatment, NegChat, the prots took longer to
recover, but they did experience strong recovery to almost exactly the pre-shock levels in the later
periods (see Figure 2). 2
Note that in the absence of any capacity coordination, a demand reduction would be expected
to reduce the earnings of the sellers in the market, unless the earnings were already zero (as under
perfect competition). Again, the above nding suggests the potential for consumer-welfare reducing
collusion in markets where explicit capacity coordination is possible. Of course, if the policy goal is
to maintain the solvency of rms in the face of losses from a demand shock, these ndings suggest
the potential of capacity coordination to reduce losses and increase protability to rms.
We now turn to comparison of treatments that allow for explicit capacity coordination. We
consider the eect of the agreement enforcement rst, by comparing NegNoPun and NegPun treat-
ments.
Result 8 Punishment for non-compliance in capacity coordination treatments had little eect on
performance in the early periods after the negotiations started. In later periods, markets with ca-
pacity enforcement maintained low Cournot-level capacities and high prots, while markets without
enforcement exhibited more variable capacities and a drop in prots.
15Support: Figure 2, Tables 2-4. Average market capacities, prices and subject prots were
virtually identical between the NegNoPun and the NegPun treatments in the rst seven periods
after the negotiations started (periods 25-31). The average capacities and prices were exactly at
the Cournot prediction, with the prots not signicantly dierent from the Cournot level. In later
periods (periods 32-end), average capacities, prices and prots stayed unchanged in the NegPun
treatment, whereas in the NegNoPun treatment, the average market capacity increased from 146.64
units to 161.19 units, and the average subject prot decreased from 1021.18 to 855.34 experimental
dollars. The decrease in prots from early to late after-shock periods was marginally signicantly
larger in NegNoPun treatment than in the NegPun treatment (p=0.0905, WMW test). In addition,
capacities in NegNoPun became more variable: the standard deviation of average market capacity
across markets increased from 38.68 units in the early after-shock periods to 68.35 units in the late
periods. At the same time, the standard deviation of capacity in the NegPun markets remained
unchanged at about 33 units between these two time intervals. 2
The negligible eect of enforcement, especially in early negotiations periods, may appear sur-
prising. Comparison of agreed-upon capacities with actual rm capacity choices in negotiations
treatment provides explanation for this phenomenon. Table 5 compares agreed-upon and actual
per-person average market capacities in negotiation treatments in early and late negotiation peri-
ods.19
TABLE 5 AROUND HERE
The table indicates that in the negotiation treatment with agreement enforcement (NegPun), the
subjects were more careful in not exceeding agreed-upon capacities as compared to the treatment
with no agreement enforcement (NegNoPun); the average deviation from agreed-upon capacity in
the early negotiations periods in NegPun markets was -6.89, which was signicantly dierent (lower)
than the average deviation of 6.23 in NegNoPun markets (p-value is 0.0112). This indicates that
conditional on agreed capacity levels, the capacity agreements were more eective (better enforced)
in the punishment treatment. However, the average agreed-upon capacity was marginally higher in
the NegPun markets as compared to NegNoPun markets: 78.67 in NegPun as compared to 65.64
in NegNoPun (p-value 0.1053). That is, capacity agreements were less stringent in view of the
punishment. The two eects worked in opposite directions, resulting in no dierences in actual
capacities between these two treatments in the early negotiations periods. In later periods (periods
32-end), both the average agreed-upon capacity and the capacity deviations from the agreement
slightly increased in NegNoPun markets, most likely due to the lack of enforcement. This led to
more variable market capacities and a drop in individual prots (Result 8). In contrast, the actual
19The average capacity deviation of the capacities from the agreed-upon capacities reported in Table 5 are calculated
using individual market averages as units of observations; thus, the average deviations are not necessarily equal to
the dierences between the average agreed-upon and actual capacities.
16capacities in NegPun treatment (with enforcement) remained below the agreed level, resulting in
more stable capacities and prots.
In sum, the apparent inecacy of the punishment mechanism in the early after-shock periods
may be attributed to the subjects' reluctance to set low capacity targets in view of the punishment
for exceeding these targets. Nevertheless, capacity agreements were followed through more carefully
in the markets with punishment, thus leading, in the late periods, to more stable agreements and
higher prots. In the markets without agreement enforcement, sellers tended to deviate from
agreed-upon capacities more with time, undermining the advantages of capacity coordination in
the late periods.
We next consider the eect of adding free-style communication on sellers' ability to increase
price and earnings.
Result 9 Free-style communication (chat) had a signicant eect on the dynamics of capacities
and prices in late negotiations periods.
Support: Figure 2, Tables 2-4. In the early negotiations periods (periods 25-31), the market
prices, capacities and earnings in the NegChat treatment experienced the same or less sizable re-
covery after the shock as the other two capacity coordination treatments, NegNoPun and NegPun.
The picture is dierent for the late negotiations periods (periods 32-end). While the performance
of the two negotiations treatments without Chat either stabilized (as in NegPun) or even slightly
deteriorated (as in NegNoPun), the NegChat markets demonstrated a signicant decrease in ca-
pacities (p-value for the dierence between early and late negotiation periods is 0.0136, sign rank
test, two-sided), and a signicant increase in prices and prots (p-values are 0.0274 for prices and
0.0098 for prots) in this time interval. Figure 2 demonstrates that towards the very end of the
sessions, the median prices and prots in the NegChat treatment were above the medians in all
other treatments. 2
A closer look into capacity negotiations in NegChat markets allows us to explain why adding
chat to structured negotiations had little eect until the very late periods. Table 6 present a
summary of agreed-upon capacities, actual capacities, and chat contents by market.
TABLE 6 AROUND HERE
The table suggests that in only a few markets were the sellers able to quickly agree on low capacity
levels. In some markets chat was barely used at all, whereas in others the sellers took a long while
to settle on low capacity agreements (see the \Chat contents" column of the table). Most likely,
this may be attributed to participants' inexperience with the complex two-stage capacity-price
setting institution. Still, most markets were able to reach working agreements in the late periods
of the experiment. Further, even though the agreements in the NegChat markets were not enforced
17through an explicit punishment clause, the free-style communication option apparently worked as a
substitute for agreement enforcement. From Table 5, the sellers in the NegChat treatments followed
the capacity agreements most closely in the late periods; the average per market deviation of the
actual per person capacity from the agreed capacity was only 0.36 units.
The above results suggest the following. First, capacity coordination had a strong and imme-
diate eect on the industry performance, both in terms of rms' ability to reduce capacities and
to increase prices and prots. Second, the eects of additional institutional provisions, such as
explicit enforcement clause and free-style communication, became the most pronounced in the late
negotiations periods. Some of the delays in the after-shock adjustments and in treatment eects
may be due to our experiment participants having little experience with these markets at the start.
In the next section, we evaluate the likely long-term eects of the institutions after the sellers have
gained experience with the institution.
Long-term eects and market convergence
The analysis above focuses on treatment-level eects. Now we focus on market-level analysis.
Because the data displayed substantial variation across the 41 independent experimental markets,
we evaluate each market against the alternative theoretical benchmarks of interest. Further, as
the behavior in most markets may not have quite stabilized either by the time of the shock in the
pre-shock part of the session, or by the end of the session in the after-shock part, we estimate the
long-term convergence levels for capacities and prices. We use econometric techniques suggested
by Noussair et al. (1995) to study long-term convergence properties for each individual market.
This allows us to study within-treatment market heterogeneity and evaluate predictive power of
the three alternative theoretical predictions discussed in Section 2: Competitive, Cournot and
Monopoly benchmarks. It also allows us to better approximate the behavior of oligoplists with a
long-term experience with the industry, as well as evaluate the likely long-term dierences in the
institutions of interest.
The following model, adopted from Noussair et al. (1995), is used to analyze the eect of time





(B0i(1=t) + B1i(t   1)=t)Di + uit; (1)
where i = 1;::;N, is the market index, with N being the number of independent markets in a given
treatment, and t = 1;::;Ti is the period index, with Ti being the number of period observations in
a given market. Di is the dummy variable for market i. Coecients B0i estimate market-specic
starting levels for the variable of interest, whereas B1i is the market-specic asymptote for the
dependent variable. The error term uit is assumed to be distributed normally with mean zero.
18We performed panel regressions using feasible generalized least squares estimation, allowing for
panel-specic rst-order autocorrelation within panels and heteroscedastisity across panels.
The panel regressions were run separately for each treatment to allow for dierent dynamics
across treatments. To accommodate for market heterogeneity, we estimated market-specic asymp-
totes in each treatment regression. We also estimated dierent starting levels and asymptotes for
before-the-shock time interval (periods 1-21) and after-the-shock interval (periods from 25, after
capacity coordination had started in the corresponding treatments, until the end); for both time
intervals, the starting period number was normalized to one. We allowed for dierent estimates
for before and after the shock time intervals to accommodate for possible changes in convergence
processes, as all three theoretical models predict changes in convergence levels after the shock.
The distribution of capacity and price asymptotes before and after the shock, by treatment,
is displayed in Figures 3-4. The market observations are grouped into categories based on the
proximity to the pre-shock and post-shock theoretical predictions of interest: Monopoly, Cournot
and Competitive Equilibrium. As the theoretical predictions dier before and after the shock, the
horizontal axes display the predictions for both time intervals side by side.
FIGURES 3- 4 AROUND HERE
More detailed results based on the panel regression analysis are presented in Table 7 (Capacities)
and Table 8 (Prices). The tables display estimated asymptotes for each markets, along with p-values
for the Wald test of their equivalence to the Monopoly, Cournot, and Competitive Equilibrium (CE)
predictions, both for before and after the shock time intervals. The tables also present the p-values
for the equality of market asymptotes before and after the shock.
TABLES 7- 8 AROUND HERE
Based on the regression analysis, we classify whether capacities and prices in each market converge
to Monopoly, Cournot or Competitive Equilibrium levels. The results, as summarized in Tables 7- 8,
validate and strengthen our previous conclusions.
Result 10 There was considerable heterogeneity across markets both before and after the shock in
all treatments. Before the shock, most of the markets were equilibrating towards levels between the
CE and Cornot predictions in both capacities and prices. A signicant minority of markets were
equilibrating towards Cournot or monopoly outcomes even without explicit coordination.
Support: Figures 3-4, Tables 7-8. Before the shock, in 29 markets out of 41, capacity asymptotes
exceeded the Cournot predictions, with 14 of them being no dierent than the CE level. Likewise,
in 27 out of 41 markets, the price asymptotes were below the Cournot level. However, 12 markets
had capacity asymptotes at or below the Cournot level, and 14 markets had price asymptotes at or
19above the Cournot level. Two markets (market ID's 403 and 703) were able to achieve and sustain
below-Cournot capacities and above-Cournot prices even without explicit coordination before the
shock. 2
Result 11 Capacity asymptotes shifted down after the shock in most markets in all treatments.
However, markets in capacity coordination treatments were equilibrating towards eliminating excess
capacity and achieving Cournot capacities and below more often than markets without capacity
coordination.
Support: Figures 3-4, Tables 7-8. In the baseline NoNegNoPun treatment, only 40% (4 out of
10) of the markets had after-shock capacity asymptotes at or below the Cournot level, and only 10%
(1 market) had reduced capacity to Monopoly level. Whereas for the three capacity coordination
treatments, 71.0% (or 22 out of 31) markets had asymptotes at or below the Cournot level, with
45% of markets (14 out of 31) reducing capacities to monopoly level. 2
Result 12 Capacity coordination had a long-term pro-collusive eect on market prices: Without
coordination, price asymptotes stayed the same or shifted down after the shock, whereas with coor-
dination, price asymptotes often shifted up after the shock, with prices in many markets converging
to monopoly levels.
Support: Figures 3-4, Tables 7-8. In the overwhelming majority of markets without coordination
(9 out of of 10 markets), price asymptotes shifted down or stayed the same after the shock. In
treatments with coordination, price asymptotes shifted up in 38.7% (12 out of 31) of markets; in
41.9% of markets with coordination (13 markets out of 31), price asymptotes after the shock were
no dierent from the Monopoly level. 2
Result 13 Among all treatments, the NegChat treatment that allowed free-style negotiations in
addition to structured capacity coordination resulted in the highest share of markets converging
to monopoly outcomes. However, the dierence in proportions of monopoly markets between the
NegChat treatment and other capacity coordination treatments is not statistically signicant.
Support: Figures 3-4, Tables 7-8. In NegChat treatment, 80% (or 8 out of 10) of markets were
converging to Cournot or above price levels, with 50% (or 5 out of 10) of markets converging to
monopoly pricing. This compares to only 10% (1 out of 10) of markets converging to monopoly
prices in no negotiations NoNegNoPun markets; the dierence is marginally signicant (p-value is
0.0704, Fisher exact test, one-sided). However, both NegNoPun and NegPun markets also had a
signicant proportion of markets (40% and 45%, respectively) converging to monopoly pricing. 2
204 Discussion
This study provides us with a number of compelling results suggesting likely eects of capacity
coordination on industry performance. Even though many subjects in our experiments tend to
invest in excess capacity, the subjects quickly reduce capacity in response to a demand reduction in
all treatments. This presents evidence that cost-cutting capacity reduction in industries in crisis can
occur even if rms are unable to coordinate the reductions explicitly. However, we do observe that
explicit capacity coordination results in a faster and larger reduction of market capacity following
a demand shock, and a faster recovery of rm prots after the shock.
Further, our laboratory evidence clearly supports the conclusions of Blair et. al. (2007) and
Kamita (2010) that the anti-trust exemptions have a pro-collusive eect, allowing prices to quickly
return to pre-shock levels and then even rise above those levels despite a decrease in demand. The
corresponding ability of capacity coordination to bring prices to monopoly levels in many markets
suggests that anti-trust exemptions are likely to have a detrimental eects on consumer welfare.
An unexpected nding is the relative lack of importance of the punishment mechanism in
enforcing capacity agreements, especially in early negotiations periods. Even though capacity
coordination markets with enforcement had a less variable performance than capacity coordination
markets with no enforcement towards the end of the experiment, the evidence is insucient to
predict signicant dierences between the two capacity coordination institutions in the long-run,
as documented by the convergence dynamics analysis in Section 3. This suggests that the repeated
nature of the game, supplemented by structured capacity coordination, may be sucient to establish
and sustain collusive practices, rendering explicit punishment mechanisms super
uous. However,
we do nd that free style communication in addition to structured negotiations may benet the
sellers even further; our experimental markets with free-style communication resulted in a higher
share of monopoly outcomes than any other institution.
The nding that free-style communication does at least as well or better than explicit agreement
enforcement may be somewhat surprising.20 Yet, it is well in line with the existing experimental
literature, which presents ample evidence that free-style non-binding communication often leads to
increased cooperation (Holt, 1995). A likely reason, in view of the ndings in behavioral economics,
is that communication helps to \break the ice" and reduce social distance among competitiors.
Armstrong and Huck (2010) point out that an implication for competition policy is that commu-
nication may foster a sense of loyalty and trust among rms, making it socially costly to cheat on
agreements. Armonstrong and Huck propose further that face-to-face communication seems to fos-
ter collusion in the laboratory more eectively than computer-mediated communication. However,
our experiments suggest that computer-mediated structured negotiations, supplemented by on-line
20We are grateful to Rene Kamita for pointing this out.
21chat, may be sucient to resolve coordination problems and establish trust among rms.
It may also be surprising that not all sellers in our experiment were able to take full advantage
of coordination opportunities, with, at most, half of all markets converging to monopoly outcomes,
even in the treatment with free-style negotiations. Again, this result is well in line with previous
market experiments. Holt (1995) concludes that the eectiveness of of non-binding communication
in experimental markets is variable and sensitive to many factors, including the trading institution
and the participants' incentives to defect. Andersson and Wengstroem (2007) report that when
given a chance to costlessly communicate by computer in a repeated Bertrand duopoly, subjects
exchanged messages frequently, but they had diculties in maintaining collusive agreements. The
two-stage Kreps and Sheinkman (1993) duopoly that we study is arguably more complicated than
Bertrand price-setting duopoly; we therefore consider the observed 50% perfect collusion rate quite
high.
It is notable that we obtain convincing evidence on the eects of capacity coordination on
industry outcomes despite the rather complex nature of the institution and the lack of experience
of our experimental subjects. One would expect the eects of capacity coordination to be even more
pronounced with experienced and highly motivated sellers. For this reason, we believe that these
experimental results, along with already existing empirical evidence, may have strong implications
for real-world industry practices.
Appendix A: Instructions and Quiz
Appendix B: Subject decision screen: price-setting stage
Appendix C: Treatment eects: panel regressions
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26TABLE 1. Summary of Experimental Sessions





5/4/2007 1 UHM 2 35 N
5/22/2007 4 UHM 4 39 Y
6/10/2010 12 UAA 4 39 Y
5/10/2007 2 UHM 2 39 N
5/18/2007 3 UHM 3 39 N
5/23/2007 5 UHM 3 39 Y
6/3/2010 10 UAA 3* 39 Y
5/24/2007 6 UHM 4 39 Y
4/27/2010 9 UAA 2 39 Y
6/9/2010 11 UAA 4 39 Y
9/28/2007 7 UHM 5 36 Y
10/3/2007 8 UHM 2 39 Y
6/17/2010 13 UAA 3 39 Y



























132 132 108 108 108
176 176 144 144 144
264 264 216 216 216
Mean 227.74 234.56 205.50 184.20 169.90
(52.31) (49.63) (58.50) (42.24) (34.70)
Mean 221.35 227.61 198.58 143.78 145.65
53.78 81.99 52.15 33.59 33.92
Mean 277.71 234.24 211.87 146.64 161.19
(74.27) (52.83) (54.04) (38.86) (68.35)
Mean 254.49 230.36 212.13 178.61 144.92



























43 43 37 37 37
32 32 28 28 28
10 10 10 10 10
Mean 25.08 25.63 23.47 22.21 25.22
(8.60) (7.70) (9.72) (7.46) (6.21)
Mean 27.06 27.29 21.54 29.64 28.26
(6.16) (9.01) (5.73) (6.88) (7.77)
Mean 23.97 24.16 21.49 29.82 28.56
(5.59) (9.15) (7.15) (6.61) (8.84)
Mean 24.50 24.96 20.54 26.50 31.81
(9.84) (8.17) (5.75) (9.38) (9.34)


























2178 2178 1458 1458 1458
1936 1936 1296 1296 1296
Benchmark Predictions:
Monopoly
Cournot 1936 1936 1296 1296 1296
00 0 0 0
Mean 1133.87 1142.97 568.83 675.02 930.94
(603.50) (628.93) (516.68) (512.69) (426.23)
Mean 1260.54 1261.85 648.06 1118.41 1122.80
(579.74) (830.16) (483.82) (346.21) (363.97)







Mean 781.16 1049.98 440.40 1021.18 855.34
(701.91) (555.12) (525.43) (311.82) (509.69)
Mean 897.57 1091.24 502.57 716.70 1066.46























Mean 92.31 84.08 0.0527
(20.72) (16.86)
Mean 78.67 71.61 -6.89 82.44 72.90 -9.54 0.9658 0.9658 0.8310
(23.14) (16.32) (7.91) (28.21) (17.19) (22.71)
Mean 65.64 72.61 6.23 71.01 80.26 8.64 0.2322 0.4922 0.8458
(15.83) (18.69) (17.95) (26.13) (33.11) (32.59)
Mean 98.84 90.69 -11.14 76.66 73.82 0.36 0.0098 0.0274 0.0040
(43.25) (33.19) (12.18) (33.28) (29.41) (8.70)
p-value:*  NegPun=NegNoPun 0.1053 0.9439 0.0112 0.2050 0.8880 0.0183
p-value:*  NegNoPun=NegChat 0.0288 0.2798 0.0052 0.6842 0.6842 0.0524
p-value:*  NegPun=NegChat 0.2908 0.2050 0.5261 0.3240 0.7782 0.3964
* Wilcoxon Mann Whitney ranksum test









Early Negotiations:       
Periods 25-31
Late Negotiations:       
Periods 32-end
NoNegNoPun (10 obs)



































UHM 701 25-38 12 12 25 38 yes 101.25 85.21
(22.48) (29.48)
UHM 702 25-38 12 12 25 38 yes 112.27 101.25
(15.71) (21.33)
UHM 703 25-38 12 5 26 35 yes 63.75 60.04
(11.51) (4.92)
UHM 704 25-38 12 0 n/a n/a n/a 158.00 137.63 Chat was not used, capacity set too high
(58.08) (24.90)
UHM 705 25-38 12 12 25 38 no 50.60 55.71
(34.57) (45.22)
UHM 801 25-39 15 6 26 37 yes 60.00 57.27
(0.00) (8.62)
UHM 802 25-39 15 0 n/a n/a n/a 57.33 69.97
(15.45) (9.38)
UAA 1301 25-39 15 2 26 34 yes 130.50 114.27
(68.72) (30.13)
UAA 1302 25-39 15 2 25 30 yes 53.33 52.10
(10.47) (10.60)
UAA 1303 25-39 15 4 25 34 yes 84.00 81.13
(55.27) (55.49)
*In market 701, specific capacity was not agreed upon in 4 negotiations periods
No chat, noisy capacity negotiations with frequent 
deviations
Only used chat in 2 periods. Capacity set was 
highly variable and too high
Negotiated effectively without chat. Used chat to 
restate capacity proposals in two periods only. 
 Did not use chat much. Agreed on capacity of 50 
only in period 34. 
Summary of Chat content
Tried to implement a rotation shceme that only 
worked in the last 2 periods
Chose too high a capacity of 120 per person, only 
lowered capacity in the last 2 periods
First time chat was used (period 26), agreed on a 
low capacity of 60
Did not discuss capacity or price, but still set low 
capacity 
Agreed on capacity of 60 in period 27; later used 












































101 240.58 10.93 0.0000 0.0000 0.0321 b/w CE,Cour 192.51 14.33 0.0000 0.0007 0.1011 CE 0.0071 down
102 237.13 9.35 0.0000 0.0000 0.0040 b/w CE,Cour 235.16 12.08 0.0000 0.0000 0.1128 CE 0.8976 same
401 194.18 15.46 0.0001 0.2398 0.0000 Cournot 149.14 18.30 0.0246 0.7789 0.0003 Cournot 0.0638 same
402 250.85 6.81 0.0000 0.0000 0.0534 CE 170.42 8.18 0.0000 0.0012 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 0.0000 down
403 138.97 3.85 0.0701 0.0000 0.0000 Monop 108.68 4.64 0.8831 0.0000 0.0000 Monop 0.0000 down
404 277.09 15.48 0.0000 0.0000 0.3978 CE 179.68 17.94 0.0001 0.0467 0.0429 b/w CE,Cour 0.0001 down
1201 292.07 22.13 0.0000 0.0000 0.2046 CE 142.83 27.35 0.2028 0.9660 0.0075 Cournot 0.0000 down
1202 311.37 9.24 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 above CE 178.39 11.57 0.0000 0.0030 0.0012 b/w CE,Cour 0.0000 down
1203 178.66 6.15 0.0000 0.6657 0.0000 Cournot 155.56 7.54 0.0000 0.1251 0.0000 Cournot 0.0196 down
1204 186.56 7.63 0.0000 0.1666 0.0000 Cournot 165.66 9.51 0.0000 0.0227 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 0.0890 same
NegNoPun treatment
601 275.14 21.20 0.0000 0.0000 0.5995 CE 116.69 25.65 0.7347 0.2871 0.0001 Monop 0.0000 down
602 212.05 10.45 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 161.95 13.02 0.1680 Cournot 0.0029 down
603 195 51 79 3 0 0000 0 0139 0 0000 b/w CE Cour 105 16 10 00 0 7766 0 0001 0 0000 Monop 0 0000 down
Before Shock After Shock
603 195.51 7.93 0.0000 0.0139 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 105.16 10.00 0.7766 0.0001 0.0000 Monop 0.0000 down
604 297.98 32.05 0.0000 0.0001 0.2890 CE 309.24 40.03 0.0000 0.0000 0.0199 above CE 0.8272 same
901 202.05 7.70 0.0000 0.0007 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 107.00 9.68 0.9176 0.0001 0.0000 Monop 0.0000 down
902 244.14 16.81 0.0000 0.0001 0.2375 CE 241.57 21.18 0.0000 0.0000 0.2273 CE 0.9240 same
1101 330.54 27.24 0.0000 0.0000 0.0146 above CE 166.87 33.61 0.0798 0.4962 0.1438 Cournot 0.0002 down
1102 261.13 21.78 0.0000 0.0001 0.8952 CE 138.64 27.49 0.2650 0.8456 0.0049 Cournot 0.0004 down
1103 188.69 86.19 0.5107 0.8829 0.3822 Cournot 89.09 105.88 0.8582 0.6040 0.2307 Monop 0.4729 same












































201 365.45 13.90 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 above CE 101.85 17.34 0.7227 0.0151 0.0000 Monop 0.0000 down
202 174.25 4.17 0.0000 0.6754 0.0000 Cournot 180.34 5.08 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 0.3635 same
301 284.63 11.34 0.0000 0.0000 0.0689 CE 201.56 14.27 0.0000 0.0001 0.3115 CE 0.0000 down
302 205.55 14.68 0.0000 0.0441 0.0001 b/w CE,Cour 156.51 18.41 0.0084 0.4967 0.0012 Cournot 0.0377 down
303 201.81 7.25 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 196.08 9.15 0.0000 0.0000 0.0295 b/w CE,Cour 0.6215 same
501 343.80 16.40 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 above CE 106.05 20.06 0.9225 0.0585 0.0000 Monop 0.0000 down
502 178.91 9.39 0.0000 0.7564 0.0000 Cournot 149.09 11.82 0.0005 0.6670 0.0000 Cournot 0.0476 down
503 188.43 6.09 0.0000 0.0414 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 114.44 7.57 0.3952 0.0001 0.0000 Monop 0.0000 down
1001 200.95 6.81 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 159.09 8.58 0.0000 0.0788 0.0000 Cournot 0.0001 down
1002 169.50 8.30 0.0000 0.4336 0.0000 Cournot 112.86 10.45 0.6417 0.0029 0.0000 Monop 0.0000 down
1003 188.40 8.84 0.0000 0.1609 0.0000 Cournot 93.32 10.93 0.1792 0.0000 0.0000 Monop 0.0000 down
NegChat treatment
701 258.61 18.57 0.0000 0.0000 0.7717 CE 157.57 26.81 0.0644 0.6126 0.0293 Cournot 0.0021 down
702 325 95 16 78 0 0000 0 0000 0 0002 above CE 194 36 24 48 0 0004 0 0396 0 3768 CE 0 0000 down
Before Shock After Shock
702 325.95 16.78 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 above CE 194.36 24.48 0.0004 0.0396 0.3768 CE 0.0000 down
703 149.95 5.35 0.0008 0.0000 0.0000 b/w Cour,Mon 114.03 7.23 0.4045 0.0000 0.0000 Monop 0.0001 down
704 301.41 18.67 0.0000 0.0000 0.0451 above CE 257.12 26.85 0.0000 0.0000 0.1256 CE 0.1804 same
705 308.09 25.93 0.0000 0.0000 0.089 CE 84.91 36.94 0.5319 0.1097 0.0004 Monop 0.0000 down
801 217.28 8.21 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 116.35 10.32 0.4181 0.0074 0.0000 Monop 0.0000 down
802 171.15 6.66 0.0000 0.466 0.0000 Cournot 137.48 8.03 0.0002 0.4174 0.0000 Cournot 0.0016 down
1301 277.04 16.61 0.0000 0.0000 0.4325 CE 221.24 20.99 0.0000 0.0002 0.8027 CE 0.0356 down
1302 175.44 14.27 0.0023 0.9688 0.0000 Cournot 87.59 17.76 0.2505 0.0015 0.0000 Monop 0.0001 down
















































101 25.83 1.81 0.0000 0.0007 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 21.54 2.35 0.0000 0.0061 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 0.1492 same
102 19.72 0.96 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 13.22 1.21 0.0000 0.0000 0.0078 b/w CE,Cour 0.0000 down
401 32.87 2.56 0.0001 0.7346 0.0000 Cournot 29.95 3.00 0.0186 0.5145 0.0000 Cournot 0.4679 same
402 23 36 08 9 0 0000 0 0000 0 0000 b/w CE Cour 24 47 10 7 0 0000 0 0010 0 0000 b/w CE Cour 0 4238 same 402 23.36 0.89 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 24.47 1.07 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 0.4238 same
403 38.79 1.08 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 b/w Cour,Mon 36.85 1.27 0.9075 0.0000 0.0000 Monop 0.2529 same
404 18.45 2.05 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 21.72 2.37 0.0000 0.0081 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 0.3045 same
1201 21.36 4.22 0.0000 0.0116 0.0071 b/w CE,Cour 29.48 5.05 0.1364 0.7696 0.0001 Cournot 0.2235 same
1202 14.35 1.44 0.0000 0.0000 0.0024 b/w CE,Cour 22.59 1.75 0.0000 0.0020 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 0.0004 up
1203 27.17 0.82 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 25.82 1.02 0.0000 0.0319 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 0.3023 same
C C d 1204 30.52 1.90 0.0000 0.4344 0.0000 Cournot 23.59 2.31 0.0000 0.0567 0.0000 Cournot 0.0231 down
NegNoPun treatment
601 19.51 1.12 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 36.85 1.36 0.9135 0.0000 0.0000 Monop 0.0000 up
602 26.05 2.23 0.0000 0.0076 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 25.49 2.77 0.0000 0.3637 0.0000 Cournot 0.8758 same
603 26.56 1.16 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 37.61 1.47 0.6753 0.0000 0.0000 Monop 0.0000 up
604 22.39 2.67 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour2 0 .51 3.25 0.0000 0.0211 0.0012 b/w CE,Cour0 .6615 same 604 22.39 2.67 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 20.51 3.25 0.0000 0.0211 0.0012 b/w CE,Cour 0.6615 same
901 30.09 1.72 0.0000 0.2679 0.0000 Cournot 36.94 2.15 0.9774 0.0000 0.0000 Monop 0.0136 up
902 22.30 2.13 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 19.71 2.61 0.0000 0.0015 0.0002 b/w CE,Cour 0.4486 same
1101 18.19 3.42 0.0000 0.0001 0.0165 b/w CE,Cour 22.52 4.42 0.0010 0.2146 0.0046 Cournot 0.4412 same
1102 20.18 1.86 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 28.01 2.32 0.0001 0.9977 0.0000 Cournot 0.0091 up
1103 30.37 8.58 0.1407 0.8488 0.0176 Cournot 40.81 10.63 0.7200 0.2281 0.0038 Monop 0.4506 same




















































201 17.08 1.14 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 38.15 1.41 0.4142 0.0000 0.0000 Monop 0.0000 up
202 35.19 0.86 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 b/w Cour,Mon 21.12 1.06 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 0.0000 down
301 15.61 1.01 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 14.61 1.28 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 b/w CE,Cour 0.5371 same
302 31.13 2.42 0.0000 0.7176 0.0000 Cournot 25.17 3.02 0.0001 0.3481 0.0000 Cournot 0.1254 same
303 27.73 1.31 0.0000 0.0011 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 19.43 1.64 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 0.0001 down
501 15.37 2.12 0.0000 0.0000 0.0113 b/w CE,Cour 38.32 2.50 0.5956 0.0000 0.0000 Monop 0.0000 up
502 33.40 1.96 0.0000 0.4765 0.0000 Cournot 27.49 2.45 0.0001 0.8334 0.0000 Cournot 0.0611 same
503 30.69 1.40 0.0000 0.3511 0.0000 Cournot 34.85 1.75 0.2199 0.0001 0.0000 Monop 0.0656 same
1001 23.59 0.75 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 26.07 0.93 0.0000 0.0370 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 0.0406 up .9 . . . b/w C ,Cou .7 . .7 . b/w C ,Cou . up
1002 36.11 2.16 0.0014 0.0569 0.0000 Cournot 34.22 2.72 0.3078 0.0223 0.0000 Cournot 0.5852 same
1003 29.64 1.48 0.0000 0.1110 0.0000 Cournot 40.95 1.84 0.0314 0.0000 0.0000 Monop 0.0000 up
NegChat treatment
701 25.08 2.89 0.0000 0.0168 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 31.12 4.20 0.1617 0.4570 0.0000 Cournot 0.2396 same
702 17.60 2.34 0.0000 0.0000 0.0011 b/w CE,Cour 30.60 3.23 0.0476 0.4207 0.0000 Cournot 0.0014 up
703 37 35 12 7 0 0000 0 0000 0 0000 b/w Cour Mon 34 60 15 9 0 1322 0 0000 0 0000 Monop 0 1470 same 703 37.35 1.27 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 b/w Cour,Mon 34.60 1.59 0.1322 0.0000 0.0000 Monop 0.1470 same
704 14.90 1.17 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 11.71 1.68 0.0000 0.0000 0.3086 CE 0.1239 same
705 17.95 2.91 0.0000 0.0000 0.0063 b/w CE,Cour 47.18 4.24 0.0162 0.0000 0.0000 Monop 0.0000 up
801 24.93 1.31 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 34.65 1.64 0.1525 0.0001 0.0000 Monop 0.0000 up
802 35.32 1.77 0.0000 0.0607 0.0000 Cournot 29.58 2.14 0.0005 0.4582 0.0000 Cournot 0.0425 down
1301 18.15 1.46 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 19.67 1.84 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 b/w CE,Cour 0.5152 same
1302 37.74 2.29 0.0214 0.0121 0.0000 b/w Cour,Mon 41.71 2.82 0.0947 0.0000 0.0000 Monop 0.2802 same
1303 15.48 2.60 0.0000 0.0000 0.0351 b/w CE,Cour 36.41 3.15 0.8519 0.0076 0.0000 Monop 0.0000 upTable 9: Treatment effects: Cross-sectional time-series generalized least squares regressions
Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z
Constant 24.83 (0.61) 0.0000 240.41 (5.16) 0.0000 1041.64 (52.78) 0.0000
NegNoPun -0.38 (1.16) 0.7410 13.25 (10.05) 0.1870 -62.11 (91.56) 0.4980
NegPun 4.96 (0.98) 0.0000 -44.06 (6.92) 0.0000 423.49 (74.01) 0.0000
NegChat 1.41 (1.36) 0.2980 -3.19 (9.94) 0.7480 -35.10 (103.24) 0.7340
Shock -3.24 (0.96) 0.0010 -25.25 (7.97) 0.0020 -495.21 (93.77) 0.0000
Shock, NegNoPun -2.52 (1.90) 0.1840 8.37 (16.21) 0.6050 -192.27 (163.16) 0.2390
Shock, NegPun -1.56 (1.54) 0.3110 14.41 (11.20) 0.1980 -159.85 (132.47) 0.2280
Shock, NegChat -1.60 (1.80) 0.3720 6.68 (13.16) 0.6120 -299.88 (149.73) 0.0450
After shock -1.54 (0.98) 0.1160 -49.96 (8.19) 0.0000 -231.07 (89.40) 0.0100
After shock, NegNoPun 5.44 (1.90) 0.0040 -45.37 (16.35) 0.0060 192.20 (155.87) 0.2180
After shock, NegPun 1.98 (1.58) 0.2080 5.71 (11.25) 0.6120 -197.23 (126.09) 0.1180
After shock, NegChat -0.54 (1.99) 0.7850 19.69 (14.58) 0.1770 -343.60 (158.32) 0.0300
Late after shock, NoNeg 1.41 (0.97) 0.1460 -15.24 (8.04) 0.0580 165.90 (92.38) 0.0730
Late after shock,NegNoPun -2.53 (1.64) 0.1220 13.80 (14.13) 0.3290 -173.88 (131.76) 0.1870
Late after shock,NegPun -0.43 (1.22) 0.7250 -2.89 (7.86) 0.7130 87.70 (92.18) 0.3410
Late after shock,NegChat 4.73 (1.58) 0.0030 -26.77 (10.93) 0.0140 310.47 (121.31) 0.0100
Number of obs 1578* 1580 1580
Log likelihood -4927 -8264 -11888
Heteroskedastic panels;  panel-specific autocorrepaltion AR(1)
*Trading price observations are missing for markets with zero sales (two cases)





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































You are about to participate in an experiment in the economics of market decision making in 
which you will earn money based on the decisions you make. All earnings you make are yours to 
keep and will be paid to you IN CASH at the end of the experiment. 
 
During the experiment all units of account will be in experimental dollars. Upon concluding the 
experiment, you will paid 1 dollar in cash for every 1500 experimental dollars you earn in the 
experiment.  Your cash earnings plus a show up payment of 5 dollars will be paid to you in 
private. 
 
You will begin the experiment with 7500 experimental dollars.  This is NOT part of your show-
up payment.  
 
Note your Current Earnings in the box at the top of the screen. 
 
Do not communicate with the other participants except according to the specific rules of the 
experiment. If you have a question, feel free to raise your hand. An experimenter will come over 
to you and answer your question in private. 
 
If you have any questions at this point, please raise your hand. 
 
Click Continue when you are ready go on. 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
Markets and Trading Periods 
 
In this experiment you are going to participate in a market in which you will be selling units of a 
fictitious good. At the beginning of the experiment, you will be assigned to a market with 
another participant. You will not be told which of the other participants is in your market. What 
happens in your market has no effect on the participants in other markets and vice versa. 
 
You will remain in the same market with the same other seller until the end of the experimental 
session.  This does not include trial periods.  In trial periods, you may be matched with another 
individual. 
 
In this experiment, you will be referred to by your seller ID number. Your seller number will be 
assigned to you by the computer and displayed to you in the upper left hand corner.  
 
                                                 
1 Instructions were provided to the students in an interactive format via their computer terminals. Production and trading in your market will occur in a sequence of independent market days or 
periods. The period number is also given in the upper left hand corner of the screen. 
 
Unless you have questions, click Continue to go on. 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
Decisions: Capacities and Prices 
 
Your earnings in each market period will depend on your and the other seller's capacity and 
price choices. This is how it works: 
 
At the beginning of each period, you will be first asked to choose your capacity, which is the 
number of units you will produce. You will have the opportunity to change your capacity every 
period. 
 
Both you and the other seller in your market will choose your capacities at the same time, 
without knowing the capacity chosen by the other. 
 
As a seller, you will pay the cost of the units you produce (your capacity choice) regardless of 
how many units you actually sell.  Your unit cost is 10 experimental dollars, as given in the box 
at the top of the screen. 
 
For example, if your produce 60 units, your total cost will be 60 * 10 = 600 experimental dollars. 
 
Your endowment is a flat payment you receive each period regardless of your choices.  The 
amount of the endowment is displayed under the unit cost.  
 
Example 1:   (all numbers in the examples are hypothetical) 
 
As an example, enter 60 for your capacity.  Click OK when you are done. 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
After all sellers make their capacity choices, the computer will display the sellers' capacity 
choices in your market, as well as the total market capacity. To illustrate, the computer shows 
that your capacity is 60, while other seller's capacity is 80, resulting in the total market capacity 
of 60 + 80 = 140 units. 
 
After capacities are displayed, you (and other sellers in your market) will be asked to choose the 
price that you want to sell your goods for.  You will choose your price without knowing the price 
chosen by the other seller. 
 
Computer Demand and Sales 
 
After the capacities and prices are chosen, the computer will buy goods from you and the other 
seller in your market.  For each price, there is a maximum number of units that the computer will buy at this price, called Computer Demand.  The lower the price, the higher the number of goods 
demanded.  
 
The exact number of units the computer will demand (buy) at any price is given by the following 
expression: 
 
Units Bought = 304 - ( 4 * Price ) 
 
You have a paper chart showing the computer demand at any price. This expression may change 
at any time.  If it does, you will be informed. 
 
The computer will always buy first from the seller offering the lowest price. It will buy as many 
units as it demands at this price, or until it exhausts the low price seller's capacity.   If the 
computer can still buy more units after buying all the units produced by the first seller, it will 
then buy from the seller with the higher price until it satisfies all the demand at the higher price, 
or until it exhausts all the capacity of the high price seller. 
 
To continue with our example, enter a price of 50 and click OK to continue. 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
Suppose the other seller charged a price of 55.  Because your price (50) is lower, the computer 
will buy your units first. 
 
At a price of 50, the computer will buy all 60 units that you've produced.  The total number the 
computer would be willing to buy at this price would be 304 - (4 * 50) = 104 units.  You can 
confirm this by looking at the demand chart provided to you.  But since you've only produced 60, 
that is all that the computer purchases. 
 
After buying all of your units, the computer would then consider how many more units to 
purchase at the higher price of 55 being offered by the other seller.  At this price, the computer 
demands 304 - (4 * 55) = 84 units.  However, because the computer has already purchased 60 
units from you, it will only purchase 84 - 60 = 24 units from the other seller. 
 
Your earnings are equal to the difference between your revenue from sales and the cost of all the 
units you have produced, plus your endowment. That is: 
 
YOUR EARNINGS = YOUR REVENUE - TOTAL COST + ENDOWMENT 
 
Your revenue is equal to the price you charge times the number of units you sell at this price: 
 
YOUR REVENUE = YOUR PRICE *  QUANTITY SOLD 
 
Your total cost is equal to per unit cost of production times the number of unit that you produce 
(your capacity): 
 
YOUR TOTAL COST  = PER UNIT COST *  YOUR CAPACITY  
In our example, if you produce 60 units at the unit cost of 10, and you sell all 60 units at the price 
of 50, then your revenue, cost and earnings are: 
 
YOUR REVENUE = (60 * 50) = 3000 
YOUR TOTAL COST = 60 * 10 = 600 
YOUR EARNINGS = 3000 - 600 + 50 = 2450 
 
When you understand these results, click OK to continue. 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
Example 2:    (all numbers in the examples are hypothetical)  
 
Alternatively, imagine the following situation: 
 
Your Capacity:  200  
Other's Capacity:  80  
 
Your Price:  15  
Other's Price:  15   
 
If both sellers charge the same price, then the computer will buy an equal number of units from 
both buyers to the point where the computer's demand is satisfied.  If the lower capacity seller 
sells every unit he or she produced and the computer still demands more, the computer will buy 
those units from the higher capacity seller until it has all the additional units it demands at the 
charged price or until they have purchased all of the additional units offered by the higher 
production seller.  
 
In the above example, the computer demand at the price of 15 is 304 - (4 * 15) = 244 units. 
Since both sellers are charging the same price, the computer will try to buy half of the demand, 
which is 244 / 2 = 122 units from each seller. However, because the other seller's capacity is set 
to only 80 units, the computer will buy all 80 units from this seller, and the remaining 244 - 80 = 
164 units from you. Therefore, your earnings in this period will be:  
 
Earnings = (Price * Sales) + (Unit Cost * Capacity) + Endowment  
 
= (15 * 164) - (10 * 200) + 50 = 2460 - 2000 + 50 = 510 
 
Click OK to continue. 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
Example 3:   (all numbers in the examples are hypothetical) 
 
Now suppose the capacity and price choices are as given below: \par \line \tab 
 
Your Capacity:  80 Other's Capacity:  100 
 
Your Price:  50 
Other's Price:  20 
 
In this example, the other seller is the low-price seller, so the computer will buy from that seller 
first. The computer demand at the low price of 20 is 304 - (4 * 20) = 224 units, but since the 
other seller has only produced 100 units, the computer will buy all 100 units from this seller first.  
 
To check whether the computer will buy any from you, note that at the price of 50 that you've 
charged, the computer demand is 304 - (4 * 50) = 104 units. Since the computer has already 
bought 100 units from the other seller, it will buy 104 - 100 = 4 units from you. Therefore, your 
earnings in this period will be: 
 
Earnings = (Price * Sales) - (Unit Cost * Capacity) + Endowment =  
 
= (50 * 4) - (10 * 80) + 50 = 200 - 800 + 50 = -550 
 





In order to help you determine the potential profits in light of the decisions of you and the other 
seller, you have access to the Calculator at all times.  This allows you to explore hypothetical 
situations before actually making your decisions.  
 
You may want to try it out now. 
 
Example #4:  
 
Your Capacity:  80 
Other's Capacity:  50  
Your Price:  8 




Your Capacity:  120 
Other's Capacity:  50 
Your Price:  46 
Other's Price:  38 
 
This process will continue for a number of periods. A history window at the bottom of your 
screen will allow you to keep track of capacity choices, price choices, and the resulting profits 
from all of the previous periods. You may scroll up and down the history window.  
The next period will be a trial period. It will not count towards your earnings.  After you feel 
satisfied you understand the experiment, click Continue to finish the instructions. 
_________________________________________________________ 
 





In this portion of the experiment, you and the other seller in your market will have the 
opportunity to coordinate your capacities prior to setting them.  Each of you will have the ability 
to propose a CAPACITY FOR EACH SELLER in your market. For example, if you propose a 
capacity of 150, it means that the total proposed capacity in your market is 2 sellers * 150 units 
each = 300 units.  You can change this proposal as many times as you like during this 
coordination stage. 
 
When you propose a capacity setting, the other seller sees your proposal and vice versa.  During 
this stage, you can change your proposal as many times as you like.  When you change your 
proposal, the other seller sees that change in real time. 
 
Try entering a number of capacity proposals now to see how it works. 
     
At any point during this stage, you or the other seller can end the stage by clicking Accept 
Proposal.  This accepts the most recent capacity proposal of the other seller and becomes a 
capacity agreement between the two of you.  Be careful when you choose to accept a proposal.  
It can be changed at any time up until the moment you click the button.  
 
If the time elapses in this stage without either seller clicking Accept Proposal, there is no 
capacity agreement for the period. 
 
Feel free to coordinate a capacity agreement now.  The next stage starts after you or the other 
seller in your market accepts a proposal, or time elapses. 
 





After you agree on the capacity, the agreed capacity will be shown as in the box to the right. 
 
The experiment will then proceed as before. You will be asked to enter your capacity choice, and 
then your price.  Note that in your capacity choice YOU ARE NOT CONSTRAINED TO 
ADHERE TO THE CAPACITY AGREEMENT.  You may enter whatever capacity you wish. 
 
[The following text only appears in the instructions for the punishment treatments]  
However, if you choose to exceed the agreed capacity, you will be liable to pay a penalty of 7 
experimental dollars per unit of capacity you produce over the agreed amount.  This penalty will 
be added to the earnings of the other seller in your market. 
 
Likewise, if the other seller exceeds the agreed capacity, they will pay a penalty to you.  If both 
of you exceed the agreed capacity, the penalties will offset with the actual transfer of money 




Enter your capacity choice now. 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
Then enter a price. 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
The results screen will then indicate your price, sales and costs, as well as whether you have 
exceeded the agreed upon capacity, and will calculate your resulting earnings.  
 
[The following text only appears in the instructions for the punishment treatments] 
 
Note that, in addition to your normal earnings, you may also receive and/or pay a penalty based 
on your capacity decisions relative to the agreed capacity. 
 
If neither of you had exceeded the agreed capacity, neither of you would have to pay a penalty. 
 
Also note that your calculator will NOT include penalties in its calculation of profit. 
 
[end condition] 
     
Please note that, in future rounds, you will be matched with the same other seller as you were in 
previous rounds.  These future rounds count toward your earnings. 
 






Use the calculator to answer the following questions. 
Suppose yours and the other seller’s capacity and price choices are as suggested in Example 4:  
  
Your capacity: 80 
  Other’s Capacity: 50 
 Your  price:  8 
  Other’s price: 30  
 
1.1 Will the computer buy from you or the other seller first?  (Check one)                                
_____ you; _____ other seller  
 
1.2 What are your sales? ____ Do you sell all your capacity? ______ yes; _____ no  
 
1.3 What are your earnings? ____ Do you earn or lose money?  _____earn; ____ lose 
 
1.4 Suppose the capacity choices and the other seller’s price stay unchanged. Suppose you could 
change the price, calculate how your earnings for each of the following price choices: 
 
Price:__ $5experimental;     Your Earnings: __________ 
Price:__ 10 experimental;   Your Earnings: __________ 
Price:__ 20 experimental;   Your Earnings: __________ 
Price:__ 30 experimental;   Your Earnings: __________ 
Price:__ 40 experimental;   Your Earnings: __________ 
Price:__ 50 experimental;   Your Earnings: __________ 
Price:__ 100 experimental;  Your Earnings: _________ 
 
 
1.5 From Question  1.4 above, what would be the lowest price that would allow you not to lose 
money?     _____  
 
1.6 From Question  1.4 above, at which price will you earn the most money? 
 
The price is: _______ Your earnings will be equal to ___________ 
 
1.7 Suppose now that you choose the price that allows you to earn most money, as in question 
1.6 above. (Suppose, as before, that the capacity and price choices of the other sellers stay 
unchanged.) Given this price, how can you change your capacity to increase your earnings?                       
                    Price: _____ New capacity: _____  Your earnings: ___________         
 
Are there any questions? Appendix B: Subject decision screen: price-setting stage 
 
 
 
 